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Abstract
Asymmetry in distributions of potential outcomes (i.e. skewness), and whether those potential outcomes reflect gains or
losses (i.e. their valence), both exert a powerful influence on value-based choice. How valence affects the impact of
skewness on choice is unknown. Here by orthogonally manipulating the skewness and valence of economic stimuli we
show that both have an influence on choice. We show that the influence of skewness on choice is independent of valence,
both across and within subjects. fMRI data revealed skew-related activity in bilateral anterior insula and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, which shows no interaction with valence. Further, the expression of skew-related activity depends on an
individual’s preference for skewness, and this was again independent of valence-related preference. Our findings highlight
the importance of skewness in choice and show that its influence, both behaviourally and neurally, is distinct from an
influence of valence.
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Introduction
Value-based decision-making is influenced by risk in potential
outcomes, and also by whether those potential outcomes reflect
gains or losses (i.e. their valence). Recent evidence suggests that
risk and valence exert independent influences on choice [1].
However, in those paradigms risk was defined as the variance in
potential outcomes, ignoring that a crucial aspect is asymmetry in
probabilities of possible outcomes. Such skewness powerfully
influences choice in foraging animals [2] and in humans
performing laboratory based economic tasks [3]. Indeed, attitudes
to negative skew (i.e. a small chance of a particularly bad outcome)
are important in performance measurement of financial invest-
ment [4], and attitudes to positive skew (i.e. a small chance of a
particularly good outcome) help explain gambling [5]. How the
impact of skewness on choice is affected by outcome valence is
unknown, and here we examine this relationship behaviourally
and neurally.
A behavioural influence of skewness has been highlighted in
recent work using options involving only gain amounts [3,6].
Neurally, in both studies, and also when passively viewing skewed
mixed gambles containing both gains and losses [7], skewness in
value-based stimuli was reflected in activity within anterior insula,
a region implicated in processing of uncertainty [8–10]. In
contrast, there is a dearth of behavioural data on the relationship
between skewness and valence, although the attractiveness ratings
of a skewed gamble with gains can be markedly reduced by adding
a loss outcome [11]. As far as we are aware studies of neural
encoding of skewness have relied on either gains or mixed gambles
[3,6,7].
We orthogonally manipulated skewness, variance and valence of
value-based stimuli during economic choice. Expected Value (EV)
was kept constant within these choices. Behaviourally, we tested
whether skewness influenced choice, and also asked how this
influence of skewness may relate to the influences of both variance
and valence. Using fMRI, we asked how the influence of skewness
was reflected neurally, and how this may differ according to
valence, with a particular focus on anterior insula.
Methods
Participants and ethics statement
All participants provided written, informed consent. The
University College London (UCL) Ethics Committee approved
the study. All participants were healthy and were recruited using
institutional mailing lists. 27 right-handed participants took part
(age mean 24 years, range 18–33; 13 male; one further participant
excluded who used a fixed strategy of choosing the sure option).
No participants had taken part our previous studies with related
paradigms [1,3].
Task
In this ‘‘accept/reject’’ task (Fig. 1) there were 200 trials
presented in a random order, of which 100 were ‘‘gain trials’’ (all
possible outcomes $0) and 100 were ‘‘loss trials’’ (all outcomes
#0). In each trial participants chose to accept or reject a lottery
(four possible outcomes) compared to a sure option (£12 in ‘‘gain
trials’’; £-12 in loss trials). Each trial began with a fixation cross
presented for 1-2secs (mean 1.5secs), followed by viewing the
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options for 4020msec; and finally a black square appeared to
indicate participants had 1500msec to input their choice by button
press (the black square turned white when they chose). If
participants did not respond, they received £0 on a ‘‘gain trial’’
and the maximum loss possible on a ‘‘loss trial’’ (£-24).
Our decision-variables of interest were skewness, variance and
valence. We controlled for the Expected Value (EV) of the lottery,
which was always equal to the sure option (i.e. £12 or £-12). We
manipulated the two aspects of risk by using a set of 100 lotteries
(four possible outcomes, all $0; Fig. 1b) in which we paramet-
rically and orthogonally manipulated the degree of skewness (10
levels, with half positively skewed and half negatively skewed) and
variance (10 levels). We presented each lottery in this set once to
give 100 ‘‘gain trials’’. To manipulate valence, we multiplied all
amounts by –1 to give 100 ‘‘loss trials’’ (i.e. all outcomes#0, and a
sure option of £-12). This created a set of ‘‘gain trials’’ and a set of
‘‘loss trials’’ that were matched in their parametric modulations of
skewness and variance.
Participants began the day with an endowment of £24. After
the experiment, one ‘‘gain trial’’ and one ‘‘loss trial’’ were picked
at random and their outcomes were added to the endowment to
determine payment. Participants could receive between £0–48.
Stimulus sets
We generated the set of 100 ‘‘gain trials’’ in two stages. First, we
generated a list of every possible trial within the following
constraints: lottery EV was £12 (i.e. equal to the sure option); each
lottery had four outcomes (i.e. four pie chart segments); outcomes
were between £0–£24; the smallest allowable probability was 0.1;
and the smallest allowable probability increment was 0.05.
Second, from within this very large number of potential trials,
we selected our set of 100 trials that were the closest match to our
desired 10 levels of skewness and 10 levels variance. Variance
ranged from 7 to 124, skewness ranged from –317 to 317 (absolute
skewness ranged from 30 to 317).
Calculation of EV, Variance and Skewness. For a given
lottery with N potential outcomes (m1, m2,… mN), with probabil-
ities p= p1, p2, …pN, we define the EV, variance (Var) and
skewness (Skw) of the outcome distribution as follows:
EV~
XN
n~1
mnpn ð1Þ
Var~
XN
n~1
mn{EVð Þ2pn ð2Þ
Skw~
XN
n~1
mn{EVð Þ3pn ð3Þ
Statistical analysis
In our behavioural analyses, statistical tests were carried out
using paired or independent-samples t-tests, or mixed analyses of
variance (ANOVA) in SPSS; reported p-values are two-tailed.
Reaction time analysis
We normalised each individual’s RTs by taking the natural
logarithm, mean-correcting and dividing by the standard devia-
tion. However, we note that our findings were the same
irrespective of having used ‘‘raw’’ or normalised RTs.
Behavioural modelling
We modelled choice using utility functions described previously
[1]. Additionally we assessed utility functions explicitly including
an influence of skewness on choice. We fit data on an individual
participant basis, modelling behaviour by estimating model
parameters using maximum likelihood analysis implemented in
Matlab. We compared models with different utility functions using
Group Bayes Factors, where the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) penalisies model complexity [12]. In all our models, on each
trial the subjective values, or utilities (U), of both options were
computed using one of the utility functions below. These values
were then compared to generate a trial-by-trial probability of each
choice, using a softmax function with a free parameter b
(constrained between 0 and 20) that allows for noise in action
selection.
The behavioural modelling enables us to confirm that our
manipulations of skew, variance and valence consistently influ-
enced choice. Therefore, to illustrate the influences of variance
and valence on choice we used the same two models we used
previously to illustrate these effects with unskewed lotteries [1].
First, to test for an influence of variance we used a Mean-Variance
model (U = EV + Var*r), in which r is a free parameter (a risk-
neutral individual has r=0, risk-averse r,0, and risk-seeking
r.0). Second, to test an additional influence of valence we used
the winning Mean-Variance-Valence (MVV) model from our
previous datasets with unskewed lotteries [1], with a rgain
parameter reflecting risk preference in gain trials and a rloss
Figure 1. Experimental design. Our design orthogonally manipu-
lates variance, skewness and valence in a modification of our ‘‘accept/
reject’’ task (previously in this task we parametrically manipulated EV
and lotteries were unskewed). a) In each ‘‘gain trial’’ individuals chose to
accept a lottery (4 possible outcomes, all $0; EV £12) or reject and so
receive £12 for certain. b) We created a set of 100 ‘‘gain trials’’ that
parametrically and orthogonally manipulated the degree of skewness
(10 levels) and variance (10 levels) of the lotteries. In this set of gain
trials half had positive skew (e.g. panel c), and half had negative skew
(e.g. panel d) (the two example lotteries in panels c and d are
highlighted in panel b by circles). e) Multiplying all ‘‘gain trial’’ amounts
by –1 gave 100 ‘‘loss trials’’ with identical parametric manipulations.
Panel f shows the example lottery in panel c when it is a loss trial, and
panel g shows the example lottery in panel d when it is a loss trial. All
200 trials were presented in random order.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083454.g001
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parameter reflecting risk preference in loss trials. Third, in the
current study we added the influence of skewness in an MVV-
skewness model (U = Mean + r*Variance + y*skew) with the free
parameter y reflecting skew-preference in addition to those for
rgain, and rloss. Note that in this study lottery EV does not
contribute as it always equals the sure option. We also
implemented Expected Utility, Prospect Theory and Cumulative
Prospect Theory models, as previously detailed in [1].
fMRI data acquisition
This was identical to that previously reported in [1]. Using a 3T
Allegra scanner (Siemens) each participant underwent one
functional run (515 volumes), acquired using a gradient-echo
EPI sequence (46 transverse slices; TR, 2.76 secs; TE, 30 ms;
363 mm in-plane resolution; 2 mm slice thickness; 1 mm gap
between adjacent slices; z-shim –0.4 mT/m; positive phase
encoding direction; slice tilt –30 degrees) optimised for OFC and
amygdala. We acquired a T1-weighted anatomical scan and local
field maps.
fMRI data analysis
Functional data were analysed using standard procedures in
SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm). fMRI timeseries were regressed onto a composite general
linear model (GLM). The GLM contained boxcars for the length
of time the lottery was displayed (5.5 seconds) to examine the
decision-making process. Delta functions were also included for
button presses, lottery onset to account for visual stimulus
presentation, and for trials in which subjects failed to respond.
We modelled our neuroimaging data using a 2 valence (gain, loss)
by 2 choice (risky, sure) design, as in [1]. Additional parametric
modulators were included, with the height of the boxcar
modulated by the skewness and variance of the lottery on each
trial. Additional GLMs using modifications of this design (e.g.
alternative parametric regressors) are described in the Results. The
delta functions and boxcars were convolved with the canonical
haemodynamic response function.
We report all activations at P,0.05 that survive whole brain
correction using family-wise error at the cluster level [13], unless
otherwise stated. Clusters were defined using a threshold of P
,0.005. For presentation, images are displayed at P,0.001
uncorrected. Unless otherwise stated, small volume correction
(P,0.05) was for a sphere of 8 mm radius around stated
coordinates. Conjunction analyses were performed using the
SPM 8 conjunction null function [14].
Results
Choice behaviour is influenced by skew, variance and
valence
The influence of risk on choice is indexed by the proportion of
riskier choices made overall (PropRisk; risk-neutral = 0.5; risk-
averse,0.5; risk-seeking.0.5). Individuals were risk-averse overall
(PropRiskall 0.456s.d. 0.09; one-sample t-test versus risk-neutral,
t(26) = –3.2, P = 0.004; Fig. 2a). The impact of valence on choice is
given by the difference in riskier choices in each domain
(ImpValence = PropRiskgain-PropRiskloss). Individuals were sensitive
to valence (ImpValence 0.126s.d. 0.17; one-sample t-test versus no
effect of valence, t(26) = 3.6, P = 0.001), gambling more for gains
(PropRiskgain 0.516s.d.0.12) than loss outcomes (PropRiskloss
0.396s.d.0.12; t(26) = 3.6, P= 0.001). These data for risk and
valence replicate previous findings in a similar paradigm, where
instead we manipulated EV and variance but controlled for skew
[1].
Skewness also influenced choice (Fig. 2b). Half the lotteries were
positively skewed and half negatively skewed enabling us to assess
the impact of skewness on choice (ImpSkew = PropRisknegSkew –
PropRiskposSkew). Individuals were sensitive to skewness (ImpSkew
0.326s.d.0.20; one-sample t-test versus no effect of skew, t(26) = 8.2,
P, 161026), and individuals chose the risky option more often
when negatively skewed (PropRisknegSkew 0.616s.d. 0.12) compared
to positively skewed (PropRiskposSkew 0.296s.d. 0.14; t(26) = 8.2,
P,161026; Fig. 2b). This is the same direction of effect as in a
similar paradigm manipulating skewness only with gains (Sym-
monds et al., 2011). Strikingly, this influence of skewness
was identical regardless of whether outcomes reflected gains
(PropRiskGainNegSkew 0.676s.d. 0.17; PropRiskGainPosSkew 0.346s.d.
0.16; t(26) = 7.3, P,1610
26); or losses (PropRiskLossNegSkew 0.546s.d.
0.14; PropRiskLossPosSkew 0.236s.d. 0.17; t(26) = 7.8, P,1610
26; Fig.
2b), with no interaction seen between the effect of skewness and
valence (see ANOVA below).
For variance there was no simple categorical division between
trial types (e.g. comparable to gain v. loss, or positive v. negative
skew). However, for illustration we split trials into the half with the
higher and the half with the lower variance and then assessed its
impact on choice (ImpVariance = PropRisklowVar – PropRiskhighVar).
Variance influenced choice (ImpVariance 0.056s.d.0.11; one-
sample t-test versus no effect of variance, t(26) = 2.5, P= 0.018)
and subjects made more risky choices when the variance was low
(PropRiskLowVar 0.476s.d. 0.09), than when it was high (PropRis-
kHighVar 0.426s.d. 0.11; t(26) = 2.5, P = 0.018; Fig. 2b). There was
no interaction with valence (see ANOVA below) but was an
interaction with skewness in both gains and losses such that
variance influenced choice with negatively but not positively
skewed gambles (Fig. 2b).
Summarising these findings across subjects, a 2 valence (gains,
losses)62 skew (positive, negative)62 variance (high, low) ANOVA
(Fig. 2b) revealed significant main effects of skew (F(1,26) = 67,
P= 161028), valence (F(1,26) = 13, P= 0.001), variance (F(1,26) = 6,
P= 0.02) and no interaction except for that between skewness and
variance described above (F(1,26) = 7, P= 0.01).
Individuals’ skew preferences were independent of those
for valence or variance
We next examined inter-individual differences, asking if an
individual’s sensitivity to one decision variable predicted their
sensitivity to another. The influence of skewness on an individual’s
choices (ImpSkew) did not predict the influence of valence
(ImpValence v ImpSkew: r = 0.24, P= 0.2; Fig. 3) nor variance
(ImpVariance v. ImpSkew: r = –0.17, P= 0.4) nor the proportion of
risky choices they made overall (PropRiskall v. ImpSkew: r = –0.17,
P= 0.4).
The proportion of risky choices an individual made overall
(PropRiskall) did not predict the influence of valence (PropRiskall v.
ImpValence: r = –0.02, P= 0.9) nor variance (PropRiskall v. ImpVar-
iance: r = –0.25, P = 0.2). However, we noted a significant
correlation between individuals’ preferences for variance and
valence (ImpVariance v. ImpValence: r = –0.45, P = 0.02; i.e. more
gambling for gains than losses was associated with more gambling
for higher than lower variance options).
Behavioural modelling confirmed that skew, variance and
valence influenced choice
The purpose of the behavioural modelling was to confirm that
our manipulations of skew, variance and valence consistently
influenced choice, as shown by comparing our ‘‘summary statistic’’
models. To illustrate the influences of variance and valence on
Dissociating Influences of Skewness and Valence
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choice we used the same two models used previously to illustrate
effects with unskewed lotteries [1]. As before, the influence of
variance was captured by a Mean-Variance model that correctly
predicted 59%6s.d.7% of choices (summed BIC =7094). The fit
of the model was improved by adding valence, shown in the
winning Mean-Variance-Valence (MVV) model in our previous
datasets with unskewed lotteries [1] (BIC= 7003). In turn, that
model was improved by also accounting for skew in our MVV-
Skew model (MVVS BIC= 6102). Notably, this MVVS model
also outperformed more standard Expected Utility, simple
Prospect Theory and more complex Cumulative Prospect Theory
models (with the reference point as zero or as a free parameter),
and a modified MVVS model with separate skew parameters for
positive and negative skew. In absolute terms the MVVS model
correctly predicted 73%6s.d.7% of choices.
Reaction times
Reaction times (RTs) also showed influences of skew, variance
and valence (Fig. 4). Further, these data were consistent with each
acting as appetitive or aversive stimulus features, where it is known
that individuals are slower to approach aversive stimuli and faster
to approach appetitive stimuli [15]. We have further examined
and discussed such RT effects previously [1]. Regarding valence,
individuals were slower to approach (choose) options entailing loss
compared to gains (gains RT 5946s.d.90msec; losses 643694;
t(26) = –3.8, P= 0.001).
Regarding risk, this can be aversive, neutral or appetitive
depending on an individual’s risk preference. We found that
individuals’ risk preference with gains (PropRiskgain) strongly
predicted RT differences when approaching (choosing) the riskier
relative to the sure option (i.e. RTriskier-RTsurer) with gains (r = –
0.58, P= 0.001); and risk preference with losses (PropRiskloss)
strongly predicted the RT difference with losses (r = –0.48,
P= 0.01). Furthermore, the pattern was exactly as predicted
where risk-averse individuals were slower to approach risk; risk-
neutral showed no RT difference; and risk-seeking subjects were
faster to approach risk.
Figure 2. Dissociable influences of skew and valence on choice across subjects. A simple metric of risk preference as the proportion of
riskier choices (PropRisk; risk-averse,0.5; risk-neutral = 0.5; risk-seeking.0.5). a) Individuals were risk averse overall (i.e. PropRiskall ,0.5). Valence also
influenced choice, with more gambling for gains than losses (ImpValence = PropRiskgain-PropRiskloss). b) Choice was influenced by skew, with more
gambling for negatively than positively skewed gambles. Variance only affected choice within negatively skewed gambles, such that individuals
preferred low variance compared to high variance options. Error bars show s.e.m., * P = 0.04, **P = 0.001, *** P = 561025.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083454.g002
Figure 3. Individuals’ preferences for skew were independent
of those for other influences. The impact of skew on an individual’s
choices (ImpSkew) did not predict the effects of: a) risk overall (i.e.,
proportion of risky choices, PropRiskall); b) the impact of valence
(ImpValence); c) or the impact of variance (ImpVariance) (all correlations
p . 0.2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083454.g003
Figure 4. Reaction times. a) Individuals were slower to choose
options entailing losses compared to gains. b) Inter-individual
differences in preference for negatively or positively skewed gambles
predicted their reaction time effects. Risk preference with negatively
skewed gambles predicted the RT bias when approaching the riskier
relative to the surer option (RTriskier-RTsurer) with negatively skewed
gambles; and the same was seen with positively skewed gambles. The
same effects are observed when using both raw and normalised RT data
(normalised shown here). Error bars indicate s.e.m.. *** P = 661024.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083454.g004
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Both aspects of risk (skewness and variance) showed the same
pattern. Individuals’ risk preference with negatively skewed
gambles (PropRisknegSkew) strongly predicted the RT difference when
approaching (choosing) the riskier relative to the surer option
(RTriskier-RTsurer) with negatively skewed gambles (r = –0.52,
P = 0.005); and risk preference with positively skewed gambles
(PropRiskposSkew) strongly predicted the RT difference with positively
skewed gambles (r = –0.74, P= 961026; Fig. 4). Individuals’ risk
preference with high variance gambles (PropRiskhighVar) predicted
the RT difference with high variance gambles (r = –0.58,
P = 0.001); and risk preference with low variance gambles
(PropRisklowVar) strongly predicted the RT difference with positively
low variance gambles (r = –0.38, P= 0.048).
Neural data
We first tested for a representation of skewness in the stimuli.
Initially, we used the same 2 valence (gain, loss) by 2 choice (sure,
risky) factorial design as in our previous study with unskewed
lotteries [1], but here with lottery skewness and variance as trial-
by-trial parametric regressors. Activity is whole-brain cluster-level
corrected (P,0.05) unless otherwise stated. We replicated the
main effects of valence (greater activity for gains than losses in
bilateral striatum and obitofrontal cortex (OFC); greater activity
for losses than gains in pre-SMA/dmPFC and SVC in bilateral
anterior insula) and choice (risky.sure in posterior parietal cortex)
in the factorial analysis. Again parietal activity correlated with the
parametric manipulation of lottery variance (Table S1). However,
no activity correlated with skewness in that GLM, nor in an
alternative GLM using the modulus of the skewness (i.e. the
unsigned magnitude of the skewness in each trial).
However, robust activity was seen for skewness as it interacted
with choice (Fig. 5; Table 1). This was shown in a new GLM with
a 2 valence (gain, loss) by 2 skew type (posSkew, negSkew) by 2
choice (risky, sure) factorial design corresponding to the categorical
distinctions in our design, and with variance as a parametric
modulator. An interaction of skew type by choice in bilateral
anterior insula and pre-SMA/dmPFC (Fig. 5a) was driven by
increased activity for choosing a risky option with positive skew
(Fig. 5b), which was the specific action to which individuals were
least disposed behaviourally (Fig. 2b). Further, this pattern of skew-
related activity did not interact with outcome valence (Fig. 5b; no
suprathreshold voxels for an interaction with valence within
10 mm of the peak in each cluster) and conjunction analysis
between this activity in gains and losses revealed activity regardless
of valence in these same areas (pre-SMA/dmPFC and right
anterior insula). We also note that, as above, activity in this GLM
corresponded to the manipulations of valence (gain.loss in OFC
and striatum; and loss.gain SVC in dmPFC/pre-SMA) and
variance (positive correlation in parietal cortex; Table 1).
Next we asked if inter-individual differences in sensitivity to
skewness were also reflected neurally. Applying our impact of skew
metric (ImpSkew) to the contrast that revealed skew-related activity
above (i.e. the interaction of skew type and choice), demonstrated
a negative correlation with activity in regions including hippo-
campus and OFC (Table 2). This indicated that the less susceptible
an individual was to skewness (i.e. lower ImpSkew), the more
significant the interaction of choice and skew, driven both by
greater activity for risky.sure choices in posSkew trials, and lower
activity for risky.sure choices in negSkew trials. This correlation
was specific to ImpSkew, as skew-related activity did not correlate
with PropRiskall, ImpValence or ImpVariance. Further whilst activity for
risky.sure choices correlated with overall risk preference (i.e.
PropRiskall) in anterior insula (Table 2), this was again specific and
did not correlate with ImpSkew, ImpValence or ImpVariance. Finally,
for completeness we note there was no correlation between
variance-related activity and the ImpVariance, nor between activity
for gains versus losses and ImpValence.
Finally, we asked if neural activity correlated with unified
subjective value (SV) derived from the winning behavioural model.
In contrast to the robust findings above, No such correlation was
seen (whole brain corrected or using SVC in vmPFC, OFC and
striatum as regions of interest specified in the PickAtlas toolbox
[16] in a GLM as above but with lottery SV as the parametric
modulator, nor when using chosen minus unchosen SV, nor using
the difference in SV between options.
Discussion
Here we demonstrate that the skewness of outcome distributions
influenced choice behaviour. Furthermore, this influence of
skewness on choice was independent of valence both across (Fig.
2b) and between (Fig. 3a) subjects. Neurally, we observed skew-
related activity across subjects in anterior insula, a region
implicated in aversive representations [17,18], and between
subjects correlating with individuals’ skew preference in hippo-
campus and vmPFC/OFC. Mirroring our behavioural findings
these patterns of skew-related activity were seen for gains and
losses (Fig. 4b). These data support the idea that risk is not
monolithic, either in terms of its behavioural effects or neurally,
and instead that distinct aspects of risk including variance and
skewness can powerfully influence choice.
The observation that skewness influenced choice behaviour is
consistent with human [3,6] and animal data [2]. Our data help
characterise this influence of skewness in two further ways. Firstly,
we dissociate this influence of skewness from other aspects of risk.
Secondly, individuals’ preferred negative to positive skew, which
replicates a recent study using a similar format [3] and previous
work showing negative skew preference on average [19]. We note
that other studies have shown a mixture of participants with
Figure 5. Choosing skewed lotteries alters anterior insula
activity. Skewness may affect action-selection by influencing the
disposition to approach economic stimuli. We examined neural activity
in a GLM with a 2 valence (gain, loss) by 2 skew type (posSkew,
negSkew) by 2 choice (risky, sure) factorial design corresponding to the
categorical distinctions in our design, and with variance as a parametric
modulator. a) There was an interaction of skew type by choice in
bilateral anterior insula. As shown in panel b this was driven by
increased activity for choosing (approaching) the risky option with
positive skew, which was the specific action to which individuals were
least disposed behaviourally. Further, as shown in panel b this pattern
of skew-related activity did not interact with outcome valence.
Parameter estimates plotted for the peak of the interaction in right
anterior insula. Error bars indicate s.e.m.. *,0.05, **,0.005, ***,0.001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083454.g005
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positive or negative skew-seeking [20] or positive skew seeking
behaviour [21,22].
Neurally, we showed that skew-related activity was distinct from
the activity related to other aspects of risk. Skew-related activity
here was found in anterior insula, a region implicated in two
previous studies of skewness in gains [3,6] and when passively
viewing skewed mixed gambles [7]. Anterior insula is a region also
implicated in processing of uncertainty more generally [8–10]. In
line with other recent work with unskewed gambles [1], this skew-
related activity here was contingent on choice, and specifically
there was increased activity in anterior insula when choosing the
least preferred option (i.e. choosing the risky option when it
contained positive skew), where anterior insula is known to be
implicated in aversive representations [18].
We note that if anterior insula plays such a role we would also
expect increased activity here for choosing the lottery with losses,
as we have shown previously [1]. However, in this experiment
skew-related preference dominated behaviour (Fig. 2b) which may
have reduced sensitivity and we do not see strong evidence for
such valence-related activity. Tentative evidence for this here is
seen in the simpler GLM that collapsed across skewness type and
that showed greater activity for losses than gains (Results above
and Table S1), as well as in our main GLM where Fig. 5b shows a
tendency towards a greater effect of risky than sure choices in
losses than in gains. This could be usefully examined in future
work.
In addition to such skew-related activity across subjects,
between subjects we noted brain regions that integrate this skew-
related activity with individuals’ preferences for skewness. This was
seen in hippocampus, a region identified with reward in a meta-
analysis of value-based choice [23] and implicated in goal-directed
behaviour [24]. It was also seen in OFC, a region implicated in an
integration of preference and reward related activity [25]. In these
regions, the less susceptible an individual was to skewness (i.e.
lower ImpSkew), the greater the interaction of choice and
skewness. This closely parallels previous findings between subjects,
where for example in a framing task participants who showed less
framing exhibited greater OFC activity associated with the
interaction of choice and frame [26]. As those authors speculate,
individuals less susceptible to the frame may be better at
representing their own affective influences, which enables them
to modify their behaviour.
The influence of skewness on choice behaviour was independent
of outcome valence both across (Fig. 2b) and between (Fig. 3a)
Table 1. fMRI results across subjects.
Region L/R x y z Z #vox p
Gain . Loss
Ventral Striatum 18 5 –8 5 233 0.002
Putamen R 21 20 –5 4.9
27 11 –5 4.8
Putamen L –21 8 –2 4 271 8E-04
–15 17 –2 3.9
Amygdala –18 –1 –17 3.9
OFC L 0 44 –17 4.1 177 0.011
dmPFC R 9 68 13 3.4
OFC 6 62 –5 3.3
Supr. Frontal gyr. L/R 18 41 46 4.6 322 2E-04
Supr. Medial gyr. –3 44 49 3.7
–15 32 55 3.6
Riksier . Surer
Postr. Parietal gyr. R 42 –73 37 4.7 1551 ,1E-12
27 –67 34 4.7
Occipital 33 –79 40 4.6
Supramarginal gyr. L –51 –37 31 4.2 442 ,1E-04
Supr. Parietal lobule –24 –76 46 4.1
Supramarginal gyr. –51 –49 34 4.1
Mid. Cingulate/Postr. L/R 3 –34 40 4 243 0.003
18 –19 43 3.5
–9 –19 37 3.4
IFG (p. Tri) L –48 35 16 4.5 495 ,1E-05
Mid. Orbital gyr. –45 50 –5 4.1
IFG (p. Tri) –51 35 7 4
Mid. Frontal gyr. R 24 11 49 4.5 1242 ,1E-10
51 38 19 4.3
36 29 40 4
Precentral gyr. –48 5 40 3.8 159 0.025
IFG (p. Oper) –48 8 25 3.8
Infr. Temporal gyr. L –48 –46 –11 4.3 137 0.048
–57 –52 –5 3.9
Cerebellum –39 –55 –26 3.3
Mid. Temporal gyr. R 54 –49 –2 3.5 171 0.018
Fusiform gyr. 39 –46 –14 3.5
Mid. Temporal gyr. 60 –37 –8 3.3
Interaction: posSkew.negSkew & riskier.surer
Antr. Insula R 36 26 1 4.3 170 0.023
36 20 –11 4
IFG (p. Tri) 36 29 10 3.3
Antr. Insula L –33 17 1 3.8 187 0.015
IFG (pars Tri) –33 29 –2 3.6
–51 41 1 3.6
ACC L/R –9 32 25 3.6 223 0.006
pre-SMA/SMA 0 20 52 3.4
Mid. Cingulate cortx 6 26 37 3.3
Variance (pos. correl.)
Postcentral gyr. R 63 –7 31 3.8 199 0.007
Table 1. Cont.
Region L/R x y z Z #vox p
63 –16 31 3.8
Supramarginal gyr. 60 –25 40 3.6
This table shows all activity surviving cluster level correction across the whole
brain (P,0.05 FWE corrected; threshold of P,0.005 used to define the clusters)
for our GLM with a 2 valence (gain, loss) by 2 skew type (posSkew, negSkew) by
2 choice (risky, sure) factorial design corresponding to the categorical
distinctions in our design, and with variance as a parametric modulator. We
report all activity for all main effects and contrasts in the factorial design, and
for positive and negative correlations with variance and for the interaction of
variance in gains versus losses. Activity for loss.gain survived SVC in dmPFC/
pre-SMA (9 17 46, Z = 3.94, 103vox). For each cluster is shown: the three
constituent peaks with the highest Z-scores; the number of voxels at P,0.005
(uncorrected); and the P-value of the cluster after FWE correction across the
whole brain. (ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex; IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus;
OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; SMA = Supplementary Motor Area).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083454.t001
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subjects. The relationship between this aspect of risk (skewness),
and valence is important as the prevailing view in psychologically-
informed economics is that risk and valence have a specific
relationship, in which individuals are risk-averse with gains and
risk-seeking with loss outcomes [27,28]. Contrary to this we
observed that individuals chose the risky option more often with
gains than with losses, which precisely replicates our previous
findings in a similar paradigm with unskewed gambles [1].
Specifically regarding the relationship between the influences of
skewness and valence on choice behaviour, there has not to our
knowledge been a previous characterisation of how the influence
of skewness (e.g. positive and negative skew) is affected by an
orthogonal manipulation of valence. Supporting the idea that
these may be distinct influences, however, we note that a study
assaying attractiveness ratings of gambles showed such ratings
were dramatically altered by adding a loss to a skewed gamble with
gains (i.e. it became a mixed gamble), suggesting such a gamble
may be rendered qualitatively different [11].
Skew-related activity was distinct from that related to valence
(Fig. 5b). Previous studies of skewness have used either only gains
or mixed gambles [3,6,7]. That risk and valence may exert their
influence on choice independently is consistent with mounting
evidence that choice is the product of multiple interacting value
and decision systems, which may for example reflected in both our
current and previous data [1] by distinct behavioural effects and
neural substrates associated with risk and valence.
Finally, we note that our data also speak to a debate in the
literature between two main competing accounts for recent
neuroscientific studies examining the neural basis of risky
economic choice: that ‘‘summary statistics’’ describe the distribu-
tion of possible outcomes from a risky choice [9,29]; or that
subjective value (SV) is determined by the shape of a utility
function, with risk-preference emerging as a by-product of that
shape [30]. Here consistent with a ‘‘summary statistic’’ account we
find neural activity related to skew and variance, whilst in contrast
to these robust data, there was not equally clear evidence for
encoding of SV. However, we note that absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence. Further, an important potential reason is
provided in a recent study showing that SV representations of
more complex multi-attribute stimuli are distributed, and so
detectable using multivariate but not standard mass univariate
analysis [31].
In conclusion, risk exerts a powerful influence on value-based
decision-making and our data help parse the different dimensions
of risk. The influence of skewness on choice can be dissociated
from other aspects of risk both in terms choice behaviour and its
neural representation. Furthermore, our data show that the
influence of skewness can be dissociated from the influence of
valence on choice. These data provide evidence that distinct
aspects of value-based stimuli exert their influence through a
choice architecture wherein multiple interacting systems contrib-
ute to choice.
Supporting Information
Table S1 fMRI results for 2 valence (gain, loss) by 2
choice (risky.sure) GLM. Replicating the 262 analysis used
in our previous study that used unskewed lotteries (Wright et al.,
2012) revealed similar results across and between subjects. Panel
a) across subjects: shows all activity surviving cluster level
correction across the whole brain (P,0.05 FWE corrected;
threshold of P,0.005 used to define the clusters) for our GLM
with a 2 valence (gain, loss) by 2 choice (risky, sure) factorial
design, with variance and skewness as parametric modulators. We
report all activity for all main effects and contrasts in the factorial
design, and for positive and negative correlations with the
parametric modulators and for the interaction of the parametric
modulators in gains versus losses. Note also activity for the contrast
of loss.gain survived SVC in left AI (236 23 1 Z=4.01, 64vox)
and right AI (36 23 7 Z=3.78, 45vox). Panel b) between
subjects: shows activity in this GLM for the second level
covariate for risk (PropRiskall) on activity for risky.sure; and the
Table 2. fMRI results between subjects.
Region L/R x y z Z #vox p
ImpSkew (neg. correl.) on interaction of posSkew.negSkew and risky.sure
Hippocampus L –27 –16 –20 4.6 456 ,1E-04
Supr. Temporal gyr. –57 2 –8 3.7
–57 –7 –14 3.6
OFC L/R 3 41 –17 4.2 241 0.003
15 53 –8 3.8
–3 59 –2 3.4
Postcentral gyr. L –27 –28 70 3.8 203 0.008
–15 –31 58 3.8
Precuneus –9 –40 58 3.5
Precentral gyr. R 15 –22 73 3.8 240 0.003
36 –13 64 3.8
48 –7 55 3.8
PropRiskall (neg. correl.) on risky.sure
Antr. Insula/IFG L –30 26 –11 4.3 150 0.028
–36 17 –5 4.3
–39 17 10 3.8
pre-SMA/dmPFC L/R 6 17 49 5.3 609 ,1E-06
–6 26 46 4.9
–3 35 34 4.6
Infr. Parietal lobule L –39 –52 37 5.1 909 ,1E-08
–45 –46 46 5.1
Postr. Parietal ctx. –48 –55 37 4.9
Precuneus R 9 –67 40 5.3 939 ,1E-08
Postr. Parietal ctx. 42 –64 43 5.3
Infr. Parietal lobule 39 –52 43 4.6
Mid. Frontal gyr. L –39 17 37 4.3 337 ,1E-03
IFG (p. Tri –42 26 22 4.3
IFG (p. Oper) –51 20 34 3.9
IFG (p. Oper) R 51 5 19 4.5 1095 ,1E-09
45 17 34 4.4
Mid. Frontal gyr. 42 38 31 4.4
Cerebellum R 36 –70 –44 4.4 279 ,1E-03
33 –49 –26 3.7
27 –40 –26 3.5
This table shows all activity surviving cluster level correction across the whole
brain (P,0.05 FWE corrected; threshold of P,0.005 used to define the clusters)
in the 2 valence by 2 skew type by 2 choice model, for contrasts involving: the
second level covariate for risk overall (PropRiskall) on activity for accept.reject;
the second level covariate for skew (ImpSkew) on the skew related activity seen
across subjects (interaction of skew type and choice). For each cluster is shown:
the three constituent peaks with the highest Z-scores; the number of voxels at
P,0.005 (uncorrected); and the P-value of the cluster after FWE correction
across the whole brain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083454.t002
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second level covariate for valence (ImpValence) on activity for
gain.loss. For each cluster is shown: the three constituent peaks
with the highest Z-scores; the number of voxels at P,0.005
(uncorrected); and the P-value of the cluster after FWE correction
across the whole brain.
(XLSX)
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